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Abstract
We study the effect of the size of the welfare state on family outcomes in OECD
member countries. Exploiting exogenous variation in public social spending, due
to varying degrees of political fractionalization (i.e. the number of relevant parties
involved in the legislative process), we show that an expansion in the welfare state
increases the fertility, marriage, and divorce rates with a quantitatively stronger
effect on the marriage rate. We conclude that the welfare state supports family
formation. Nevertheless, we also find that the welfare state decouples marriage and
fertility, and therefore, alters the organization of the family.
JEL Classification: J12, J13, J18, D1, D62, H31, H53.
Keywords: Marriage, divorce, fertility, welfare state, risk sharing.
∗Corresponding author: Martin Halla, Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU), De-
partment of Economics, Augasse, 2-6, 1090 Vienna, Austria; Tel.: +43 (0)1 31336 4264; Email: mar-
tin.halla@jku.at. For helpful discussions and comments, we would like to thank Anders Bjo¨rklund,
Henriette Engelhardt-Woelfler, Alexia Fu¨rnkranz-Prskawetz, Andrea Weber, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, and
the participants of the Labor Economics Workshop of the University of Padova and the University of Linz
in Brixen (Italy), the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association in Graz (Austria), the
2011 Annual Conference of the European Society for Population Economics in Hangzhou (China), the
2011 Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Oslo (Norway), and the 2011 Annual
Conference of the European Association of Labour Economists in Paphos (Cyprus). The usual disclaimer
applies. This research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) National Research Network S103,
The Austrian Center for Labor Economics, and the Analysis of the Welfare State. A previous version
of this paper was circulated under the title “Welfare State and Family Behavior: Evidence from OECD
Member Countries.”
1 Introduction
Family and kinship traditionally provided services such as care for the young and the
elderly and provided insurance against unforeseen events such as illness and unemploy-
ment. Nowadays, governments in industrialized countries provide or at least subsidize
these services, for instance, through public health and unemployment insurance. Thus,
the role of the family may have become less important in this respect (Anderberg, 2007),
and the incentives to form a family may have decreased along with the introduction of
comprehensive welfare state arrangements. Nevertheless, the implementation of welfare
state arrangements may incorporate (implicit or explicit) subsidies of certain family ar-
rangements. If, for instance, welfare state regulations promote marriage and fertility, then
the welfare state may also exert a crowding-in effect on families. Consequently, the overall
effect is less clear.
Does the welfare state destroy or support the family? We study this issue by examining
OECD member countries in the period from 1980 until 2007. Thus, in contrast to the
existing literature, which examines specific welfare arrangements and reforms, we study
the impact of welfare state arrangements on an aggregated level. To measure the extent
of the welfare state, we mainly use public social spending as a percentage of GDP. Thus,
we evaluate the effect of the average implementation of the welfare state in the sample
of OECD member countries in the given time period. Family behavior is captured by
marriage, divorce, and fertility rates.
To obtain exogenous variation in the size of the welfare state, we turn to the literature
on the political economy of public spending. This literature stresses the importance of
political fractionalization for the level of public spending.1 We exploit varying degrees
of political fractionalization—in particular, the number of relevant parties involved in
the legislative process—as an instrumental variable. Our first stage estimations show a
highly significant effect of within-country variation in political fractionalization on public
(social) spending. The identifying assumption of our instrumental variable strategy is
that the number of political parties in the parliament affects family behavior only through
the channel of public social spending. While this assumption is not testable, it is hard
to think of another determinant of family behavior that is reasonably correlated with
the number of political parties. We show that our estimated effects are very robust to
alternative specifications where we control for the few other potential mediating links
(such as the government’s ideology or polarization). In sum, we argue that using political
fractionalization as an instrument for public social spending is a useful identification
strategy in our context.
We find evidence indicating that a larger welfare state increases the turnover in the
1See, for example, Volkerink and de Haan (2001) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) for empirical evidence
on the role of fractionalization.
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marriage market by increasing both marriage and divorce rates. Since the effect on mar-
riage is stronger than that on divorce, an increase in the size of the welfare state increases
the stock of married individuals. Further, we observe an increase in the fertility rate,
which is particularly pronounced for non-marital fertility (compared to marital fertility).
Hence, while the welfare state supports the formation of families, it crowds-out the tradi-
tional organization of the family by increasing the divorce rate and the number of children
born out of wedlock. All the estimated effects are highly statistically significant and their
quantitative importance increases when we use a narrower measurement of the welfare
state.
Three guideposts can be used to put this analysis in the context of existing literature.
First, we add to the literature that studies the consequences of the welfare state in a gen-
eral sense (Castles et al., 2010). Second, we add to the literature on demographic trends
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007).2 With the exception of the out-of-wedlock ratio, compa-
rably little attention has been paid to the influence of the welfare state on demographic
outcomes.3 In the public debate, the dominant view is that the welfare state has to adjust
to changing demographic patterns (as for instance, in the case of an aging society with
extensive pensions systems). Our finding points to the reversed link, where the welfare
state has the capacity to shape demographic outcomes. Finally, we provide empirical
support for Gary S. Becker’s claim that the organization of the family changes as the
state supplements or replaces traditional family functions. In this regard, our empirical
evidence complements the large literature examining the effects of specific U.S. welfare
arrangements on family outcomes.4
Typically, scholars use variations in welfare benefit levels across time and states to
identify the effects on family outcomes. By and large, micro analyses confirm theoretical
expectations. Moffitt (1997) concludes that many existing studies find a negative effect of
public transfers on marriage, and a positive effect on fertility. However, the estimated ef-
fects are generally small, sensitive to alternative econometric specifications, and a sizable
minority of the papers find no effects at all.5 A possible explanation for the conflicting
empirical evidence is a lack of econometric identification. Moffitt (1998) argues that many
2Economic scholars have studied the role of the economic independence of women (Isen and Stevenson,
2011), access to abortion and oral contraception (Akerlof, Yellen and Katz, 1996; Goldin and Katz, 2000,
2002), changes in divorce law (Wolfers, 2006; Rasul, 2006; Matouschek and Rasul, 2008), and reforms of
custody law (Halla, 2013).
3A notable exception is Bjo¨rklund (2006) who identifies a positive effect of the Swedish family policy
on the overall fertility level.
4Earlier papers evaluate the effect of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and more recent
papers look at Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. In the case of AFDC—where the disposable
income of recipients increases with children and decreases with marriage—one expects a decrease in
marriage, an increase in divorce, and an increase in fertility, especially out of wedlock (Becker, 1993).
TANF replaced AFDC (in 1996) and reversed some of the incentives of welfare arrangements. In fact, the
major stated goals of this legislation included reducing out-of-wedlock births and increasing marriage.
5For a survey of this literature, see Moffitt (1992); Murray (1993); Moffitt (1998); Blank (2002);
Grogger and Karoly (2005).
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papers potentially suffer from endogeneity bias resulting from the use of endogenous vari-
ables measuring welfare benefits, and from control variables that are themselves outcome
variables.6
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a
theoretical discussion of the effects of the welfare state on family behavior. Following
that, we describe our empirical strategy and the data. Then, we present the results and a
number of robustness checks. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper. All
data sources are described in the Data Appendix. A Web Appendix includes additional
estimation results.
2 Theoretical Considerations
Typical real-world welfare state arrangements incorporate explicit subsidies for certain
family arrangements. Besides explicit marriage-promoting polices (Gardiner et al., 2002;
Brotherson and Duncan, 2004), many transfer programs and tax codes include implicit
incentives to adjust marital status. In other words, the (welfare) state may directly influ-
ence the utility of being married versus being single, by either subsidizing or excising such
statuses. Similarly, the welfare state may exert a direct influence on fertility by providing
subsidies that at least partly compensate the costs of child care by providing, for instance,
subsidized health care for children and education (Cigno, 1986). We refer to these effects
of the welfare state as the direct effects, since a change in either marital status or fertility
directly results in a change in disposable income that varies across different welfare state
arrangements. If the welfare state predominately subsidies marriage, then we expect the
direct effect to result in an increase in marriage and a decrease in divorce, everything else
equal. If, in contrast, welfare state arrangements are dominated by marriage-penalizing
regulations, we should observe a decrease in marriage and an increase in divorce.7 Con-
cerning fertility, we expect that the welfare state exerts an unambiguously positive direct
effect since welfare state arrangements reduce the cost of child care. The direct effect
on the distribution of births in and out of wedlock is, however, unclear. It depends on
whether certain benefits (such as child support) vary across different martial statuses.
In addition to these direct effects, the welfare state is also likely to exert indirect effects
on family formation and dissolution by providing services that were traditionally provided
6Among more recent papers, there exist a handful of random assignment studies (see, for instance, Hu,
2003). Another related strand of literature focuses on the effects of tax law on the incidence of marriage
(Alm, Dickert-Conlin and Whittington, 1999) and divorce.
7It seems practically impossible to categorize a country’s welfare state as either having a marriage-
promoting or a marriage-penalizing effect. The number of relevant regulations is very high. For instance,
U.S. General Accounting Office (2004) has identified 1,138 U.S. federal statutory provisions—comprising
such categories as social security, taxation, employment benefits, military service benefits, and veterans’
benefits—in which marital status is a factor. It is unclear how to weigh different regulations, since their
quantitative impact may vary across individuals and across time.
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by families. While these arrangements also alter the utility of being married versus being
single, as well as the net benefits of having children, their effects do not necessarily
lead to a change in disposable income directly. According to the seminal analysis of
family formation and dissolution presented in Becker (1973, 1974) and Becker, Landes and
Michael (1977), marriage is viewed as a voluntary partnership for joint production, joint
consumption, and risk sharing. Joint production refers to the idea that by specializing in
market and non-market work, spouses can exploit their relative comparative advantages
to maximize joint output. Joint consumption of household public goods allows spouses to
reduce expenditure (compared to singles) for a given level of utility. Risk sharing means
that voluntary transfers between spouses help to smooth out fluctuations in individual
income streams.
By providing services such as care for the young and the elderly, the welfare state
reduces the need for intra-family specialization and for the production of household public
goods, which, ultimately, changes the relative utility of being married. Similarly, the role
of children as an investment, in the sense that they provide care for aging parents, has lost
importance due to the development of public pension systems, implying less incentives
for having children.
In addition to influencing the overall level of fertility, the welfare state may lead
to a decoupling of marriage and child bearing. According to Becker, marriage is an
arrangement that allows for efficient joint production, especially in the case of children.
However, by providing child care services and financial support, the welfare state reduces
the need to exploit the efficiency gains associated with marriage. Thus, the welfare state
may alter the distribution of births in and out of wedlock.
The welfare state also provides insurance against unforeseen events, and thus competes
with risk sharing provided within families. In the absence of functioning insurance mar-
kets (as in developing countries today, or in the developed world in the past), marriage,
or more generally the family and kinship, provides individuals with unique risk-sharing
opportunities. Spouses with imperfectly correlated income streams can smooth their
consumption over time by engaging in risk sharing through voluntary transfers. In the
presence of a comprehensive welfare state that provides, or at least subsidizes, insurance,
for example, against illness, unemployment, or unexpected longevity, the role of the fam-
ily as an informal risk-sharing arrangement may become less important. These indirect
effects associated with the welfare state lower the utility of being married relative to being
single, and reduce the incentive to marry and stay married. Essentially, the welfare state
may act as a substitute for the family, crowd-out its formation, and increase divorce.8
There are at least two additional channels through which the welfare state may in-
8Note that the influence of these marriage-discouraging indirect effects of the welfare state may be
mitigated by the fact that marriage has some features that makes it superior relative to the welfare state
such as trust and information advantages (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981).
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fluence the incidence of divorce, either through the matching function on the marriage
market or through assortative mating. In either case, the idea that the welfare state
subsidizes or penalizes marriage, either directly or indirectly, is also relevant. Consider
first the influence on the matching function: suppose that the welfare state predominantly
promotes marriage. Then the individuals’ reservation match quality should go down and
we should observe an increase in marriages. However, since the marginal marriages are
less well matched, the likelihood of divorce also increases. If, in contrast, the welfare state
imposes a marriage penalty, we should observe less marriages of better matched spouses,
and a decrease in divorce rates.
Consider next the influence on assortative mating. Since the welfare state generally
acts as a substitute for the family, considerations such as the ability to share risks among
spouses, for instance, become less prevalent. Consequently, other matching criteria may
gain more importance. As suggested by Coontz (2005), this may increase the importance
of love and companionship as a basis for marriage, which may reduce the match quality if
these alternative matching criteria are less stable. In fact, Hess (2004) models individuals
on a marriage market who face a (potential) trade-off between partners who provide risk-
sharing opportunities and others who fit better in terms of love. The model predicts that
if love is permanent and risk-sharing opportunities diminish over time, then emotionally
well-matched couples are less likely to divorce (compared to couples who married due
to the hedging role of marriage). In contrast, if love is only temporary and risk-sharing
opportunities remain persistent, then emotionally well-matched couples are more likely to
divorce. The empirical evidence supports the second case; couples with a relatively high
potential to share risks, that is spouses with negatively correlated incomes, are character-
ized by a significantly lower probability of divorce.9 In short, under the assumption that
other matching criteria are temporary, we expect the quality of marriages to suffer when
extensive welfare state arrangements exist.
To summarize, in a welfare state that penalizes marriages, the direct and indirect
effects of an expansion in the welfare state work in the same direction. Thus, we unam-
biguously expect a lower incidence of marriage and a higher incidence of divorce.10 In
contrast, in a welfare state setting that promotes marriage, the effect of an expansion
is unclear. If the marriage-promoting direct effect dominates the indirect effect, the in-
cidence of marriages should go up, and the number of divorces down. Whereas if the
indirect effect is more important than the direct effect, we expect marriages to decrease
and divorces to increase. In the latter case, the effect may be reinforced by a lower match
quality of marginal marriages and less-stable assortative mating patterns.
The effect on fertility is also a priori ambiguous and depends on whether any direct
9This result is also in line with the observation by Becker (1993) that “modern societies have what
may appear to be a paradoxical combination of many love-marriages and high rates of divorce.”
10Marginal marriages may have in this situation a lower divorce likelihood due to a comparable higher
match quality.
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subsidy effects are strong enough to compensate for the negative indirect effects, such
as reduced incentives to have children being associated with extensive public pension
systems. Finally, an extension in the welfare state should increase the incidence of out of
wedlock births (marriage becomes less important for child care under an extensive welfare
state), unless the welfare state has pronounced subsidies for marital birth.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
Our discussion of a potential effect of the welfare state on family behavior translates into
a regression framework of the following type:
Fi,t = αr ·WSi,t−r +
∑
i
βi · Countryi +
∑
t
γt · Yeart + δ ·Xi,t + εi,t, (1)
where the dependent variable Fi,t captures different family outcomes in country i in year
t: either the incidence of marriage, divorce, or fertility. In the latter case, we distinguish
between total fertility, marital fertility, and non-marital fertility. We also consider the
ratio of children born out of wedlock as an additional outcome. The variable WSi,t−r
denotes a proxy for the extent of the welfare state (potentially lagged by r years), and
βi and γt denote country and year fixed-effects. In our baseline specification, we include
a set of covariates Xi,t, that comprise the sex-age distribution and the prevalent divorce
laws.11 In further specifications, we will expand our set of covariates.
3.1 Measuring Family Behavior
The standard in the literature to quantify the incidence of marriage and divorce seems to
be crude marriage and divorce rates: the number of marriages (divorces, respectively) per
1,000 of the total population (e. g. Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). While this approach is
potentially problematic, since it does not properly consider the population “at risk,” and
may therefore hide some of the underlying variation in interest, data restrictions impede
better approaches in most situations. In the case of marriage, the best measure would
be the ratio of the number of marriages in a given year to the stock of the non-married
adult population.12 In order to quantify the incidence of divorce, one would prefer to
calculate the ratio of the number of divorces in a given year to the stock of the married
population. Unfortunately, the stock of (non-)married people is not available for majority
11In particular, we capture the sex-age distribution based on the share of the total population of sex
s in age group a where a is 0 − 14, 15 − 19, . . . , 60 − 64, 65+ (12 groups). Regarding the divorce law,
we distinguish between regimes where (i) divorce is not possible at all, (ii) where only mutual consent
divorce is available, and (iii) where unilateral divorce (Gonza´lez and Viitanen, 2009) is also possible. The
U.S. is the only country with within-country variation in divorce law, with states switching to unilateral
divorce law in different years. For the analysis, we impute the median-introduction year (1973) for the
U.S.
12Alternatively, one could also argue that married people are at risk to divorce and re-marry.
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of the country-years; exceptions are the years in which a population census was conducted.
As a second-best solution, we calculate the marriage rate, Mi,t, and the divorce rate, Di,t,
based on the number of cases per 1,000 of the population between 15 and 64 years of age
(henceforth adults).
To measure fertility, the literature discusses cohort and period indicators. Cohort
indicators evaluate the birth rate of women born in a given year as they attain the
end of their reproductive cycle, while period indicators asses the rate of birth to women
of different ages in a given year, and implicitly assume that they behave according to
hypothetical schedules of specific cohorts. Though cohort indicators are clearly more
precise, the literature usually uses period indicators, since they are easily available and
allow examination of recent changes (d’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005). We employ the most
commonly used period indicator, the birth rate Fi,t, which represents the absolute number
of births (to either all, married, or unmarried mothers) per 1,000 women of child-bearing
age. Information on births by mothers’ marital status is available for comparably less
country-years (see the Data Appendix for more information).13
3.2 Measuring the Extent of the Welfare State
To quantify the extent of the welfare state, we mainly use public social spending as a
percentage of GDP. Averaged across OECD member countries, total public social spend-
ing increased from 17.6 percent of GDP in 1980 to 21.4 percent in 2007 (see Figure 1).
Since the launch of the OECD Public Social Expenditure Database in 1980, this quan-
tity is consistently measured for all OECD member countries and captures expenditure
categories such as old age, health, incapacity-related benefits, family, unemployment, sur-
vivors, active labor market policies, and other (including housing).14 Quantitatively the
most important functional categories are old age, health, incapacity-related benefits, and
family benefits. In each category, public social spending comprise cash benefits, direct
“in-kind” provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes.15 On
average, cash benefits account for 61.8 percent of total public social spending. Although,
this relation has been relatively stable over time, a slight decrease can be observed since
the early 1990s. For further information, see OECD (2007).
To check the robustness of our results, we use two alternative measures of the size of
13For a large sub-sample, we have the total fertility rate (TFR) available. We find quantitatively very
comparable results (see Table B.1 in the Web Appendix). Note that while TFR is a preferred measure,
since it is not affected by the age distribution of the population, it does not allow us to distinguish
between marital and non-marital fertility.
14OECD also provides information on public social spending before 1980; however, there is an obvious
break in the series.
15Tax breaks intended to support married couples are not considered to serve a “social purpose”, and
are therefore not included in the calculations (regardless of whether or not such measures are part of the
basic tax structure). Thus, the category “family” will capture only the effect of the welfare state and not
the effect of the tax law (on family behavior).
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the welfare state, a wider measure and a narrower measure. First, we use the size of the
government sector as measured by total public spending as a percentage of GDP. This
series is available since 1970 (see Figure 1). Given that the size of the government sector
is clearly very broad and includes spending items that may be only remotely related to
family behavior, one may expect a weaker effect. Second, we use public social spending
on the family as a percentage of GDP. This series is available since 1980 (see Figure
1). This subcategory of total public social spending comprises welfare state arrangements
directly related to families, such as child allowances and credits, child-care support, income
support during leave, and sole parent payments. Public social spending on the family has
increased (averaged across OECD member countries) from 1.7 percent of GDP in 1980 to
2.2 percent in 2007; this is equal to an increase of about 30 percent.
Note that although total public spending is available since 1970, we still focus on the
data from 1980 to 2007 in our main analysis since (i) this sample guarantees comparability
of the estimation results across measures and (ii) we can avoid the rapid expansion of the
welfare state during the 1970s from influencing our results. Regardless, we report the
results based on longer sample periods in Section 4.3.
3.3 Endogeneity of the Size of the Welfare State
The size of the welfare state may be endogenous in equation (1) for at least two reasons.
First, causality may run from existing or evolving family behavior to the size of the
welfare state. For instance, the welfare state may have expanded to compensate for
declining marriage rates and provide services no longer provided within families. For
instance, Edlund and Pande (2002); Edlund, Haider and Pande (2005) argue that the
decline in marriage has increased the demand for redistribution by females (resulting in a
political gender gap), which increased the size of the welfare state. In this case, changing
family formation patterns causally affects the size of the welfare state. Second, there
may have been changes in other observable or unobservable factors—such as changes in
(sex-specific) economic opportunities, in the organization of the marriage market, or in
social norms—affecting the incentive to form or dissolve a family that are also correlated
with the extent of the welfare state.
3.4 Political Fractionalization as a Source of Exogenous Varia-
tion
To allow for a causal interpretation, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy to isolate
exogenous variation in the size of the welfare state. We suggest to instrument WSi,t−r
in equation (1) by a measure of political fractionalization, which refers to the number
of relevant parties involved in policy decisions. The choice of this instrumental variable
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is motivated by the political economy theories of public finance. According to the so-
called common pool theory, highly fractionalized systems are prone to increase spending
since individual groups do not fully internalize the costs (see e.g. Weingast, Shepsle and
Johnsen, 1981; Velasco, 2000). The larger the number of parties involved—that is, the
more fractionalized the system—the stronger is the incentive to over-spend.16 Primo
and Snyder (2008), in contrast, argue that fractionalization may lead to lower spending,
especially with respect to total public spending. Intuitively, suppose that legislators have
a choice of one large project that benefits all groups to some extent, or several small
projects where each project benefits only an individual group. Even though the large
and more expensive project might be more appropriate, individual groups may push for
smaller and cheaper projects that allow them to internalize group-specific benefits to a
greater extent. In this case, total public spending may be lower, albeit each group pushes
for an inefficiently expensive project.
The empirical evidence is also mixed. A number of studies (see e. g. Roubini and
Sachs, 1989,b; Persson and Tabellini, 2004, among others) find that more fragmented
governments lead to higher spending and deficits. However, as pointed out by Acemoglu
(2005), these results may be subject to a substantial endogeneity bias, which is typically
not addressed in a proper way. Most recently, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) exploits the
fact that the council size of local governments in Finland and Sweden is a discontinuous
function of population size and the number of eligible voters, respectively. It turns out
that—in contrast to previous evidence—the larger the council size, the smaller is the size
of the government in both settings. This finding is supported by our first-stage estimation
results.
Different measurements for party fractionalization exist. We primarily use an index
proposed by Rae (1968) that focuses on the degree of legislative fractionalization of the
party-system. In particular, the Rae-Index is defined as 1 −∑ni=1 s2i , where si is the
share of parliamentary seats for party i and n is the number of parties. This means
that a higher value of the Rae-Index indicates a more fractionalized system. We find
a very stable relationship between legislative fractionalization and public spending in
our data. The cross-sectional correlation between the Rae-Index and the level of public
spending is positive (see the upper panel in Figure 2). Hence, it appears that a more
fragmented legislative is associated with higher public spending. This relation also holds
in a regression framework (with a large set of covariates).17 However, if we augment
the regression equation with country fixed-effects—which account for unobserved time-
16The use of the terms fractionalization and fragmentation is not unambiguous in the literature. Al-
though it usually refers to the number of parties participating in fiscal policy decision making, it is also
used to describe the ideological coherence of groups involved in policy making (see Volkerink and de
Haan, 2001).
17For instance, a regression of public spending on the Rae-Index and year fixed-effects suggests that an
increase in the Rae-Index by one standard deviation increases public spending by 0.4 standard deviation.
The estimated coefficient is highly statistically significant (t-statistic is about 10).
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invariant heterogeneity—the estimated coefficient is still highly significant, albeit with a
negative sign (see the lower panel in Figure 2). Here, a one standard deviation increase
in the Rae-Index decreases public spending by 0.4 standard deviation. Importantly, the
same patterns are observable for public social spending, which is our main proxy for the
size of the welfare state, as well as for public social spending on the family. Overall, it
seems that the degree of party fractionalization is correlated with unobserved country-
specific time-invariant heterogeneity in a way that disregarding country fixed-effects can
diametrically reverse results. Clearly, the model with country fixed-effects is superior, and
we conclude that a higher degree of legislative fractionalization in the party system leads
to lower public (social) spending in OECD member countries. This finding is consistent
with the theoretical prediction of Primo and Snyder (2008), and corroborates the result
put forward by Pettersson-Lidbom (2012).
Note, however, whether a higher degree of fractionalization increases or decreases
public social spending does not affect the validity of our key identifying assumptions.
We presume that the number of relevant political parties involved in the parliament is
not correlated with unobserved factors determining family behavior. In other words,
our measure of political fractionalization must affect family behavior only through the
channel of public social spending. Thus, political fractionalization can be excluded from
the second-stage regression displayed in equation (1).
While this identifying assumption is not testable, we argue that this assumption is
highly plausible, especially, given the set of included covariates. To understand why
political fractionalization can serve as a valid instrument, it is useful to consider the
few potential mediating links (i.e., variables that are potentially correlated with political
fractionalization and family behavior). One might be concerned that there is a system-
atic relationship between the degree of fractionalization and the government’s ideological
orientation. For instance, if highly fractionalized parliaments tend to have more left-
or right-wing governments, then our instrumental variable may be correlated with un-
observed governments’ characteristics that also affect family outcomes. However, the
inclusion of a comprehensive set of covariates to capture the government’s ideological ori-
entation does not affect our estimation results. Equivalently, one might speculate about
a link between polarization within the government and family behavior. Controlling for
different measurements of polarization does not change our results. Finally, we can also
think of immigration as a potentially mediating link. For whatever reasons, more (or
less) fractionalized governments may have a different immigration policies; which in turn
might affect family behavior. Again, our results are robust to the inclusion of the share
of immigrants.
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4 Estimation Results
4.1 Main Results
Table 1 presents the main results of this paper, where we use public social spending
to capture the size of the welfare state.18 To facilitate an easier interpretation of the
quantitative importance of our estimation results, we provide in the upper panel besides
the coefficients, elasticities (using the unweighted mean as the base) and standardized
(beta) coefficients. The lower panel summarizes our first stage results. The Rae-Index is
highly significant in all specifications and the Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistic indicates that
the Rae-Index can be considered to be a very strong instrument.
The first three columns show that an expansion in the welfare state increases the
incidence of marriage, divorce, and fertility. The extent of the welfare state is not only a
statistically significant but also a quantitatively important predictor of these rates. The
estimates imply that an increase in public social spending by one percentage point of
GDP increases the marriage rate by 2.6 percent, the divorce rate by 3.8 percent, and the
fertility rate by 2.2 percent.19 This is equivalent to the beta coefficients of approximately
0.6, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively.
These results suggest that welfare state regulations contain a strong marriage-promoting
component (direct effect) that overcompensates any crowding-out due to substitutabil-
ity between the family and the welfare state (indirect effect). An equivalent relationship
seems to hold between the welfare state and overall fertility. Thus, the welfare state clearly
promotes the formation of families. However, at the same time, a larger welfare state also
facilitates the dissolution of families. The positive effect on the incidence of divorce may
result from different causal channels. First, a more pronounced welfare state may fa-
cilitate divorce by providing or subsidizing goods and services to divorced spouses that
would be otherwise only available within marriage (e.g., risk sharing). Put differently, in
the case of divorce, the indirect effect may dominate the direct effect. Second, marginal
marriages—those which would have not been formed without the marriage-promoting
component of the welfare state—may have a lower match quality, which increases marital
instability. Third, the welfare state may alter assortative mating patterns such that less
stable marriages are formed.20
18We use the subset of 570 country-years with non-missing information on the marriage, divorce, and
overall fertility rates in the first three columns. In the remaining three columns, we use the 538 country-
years with information on fertility rates by marital status.
19Interestingly, endogeneity seems to play a more important role in the case of marriage and fertility.
Here, OLS and instrument variable estimates are of opposite signs, whereas in the case of divorce, both
estimators provide the same qualitative conclusion (see Table B.2 in the Web Appendix).
20In principle, it is possible that the increased incidence of divorce drives some of the positive effect on
the marriage rate (i.e., divorces increase the supply of potential partners in the marriage market). This
could be tested with data on first (and further) marriages. However, this information is not available for
the majority of country-years.
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Given that our measurements of the incidence of marriage and divorce are both flow
measurements, our results allow the interpretation that a large welfare state increases
activity in the marriage market. This result is in line with the theoretical predication
by Anderberg (2007). A larger welfare state seems to facilitate the transitions between
different family status. This result seems plausible since such transitions are usually
associated with high cost and uncertainty. Comparing the two estimated coefficients, we
see that the flow into marriage (plus 224 marriages per 1,000 adults) is higher than the
flow out of marriage (plus 116 divorces per 1,000 adults). Thus, the overall effect of an
expansion of the welfare state on the stock of married people is positive.21
The result that countries characterized by extensive welfare states tend to have higher
fertility rates is consistent with the interpretation that the welfare state increases the
demand for children (crowding-in effect), for instance, by subsidizing children via benefits
or tax deductions.22 This direct effect seems larger than any negative indirect effect. A
more detailed investigation of fertility patterns shows that an expansion of the welfare
state also alters the distribution of births in and out of wedlock. The fourth and fifth
columns show that an expansion of the welfare state increases fertility rates among married
mothers (1.6 percent) and non-married mothers (4.4 percent). Despite the fact that an
expansion increases the incidence of marriage—and therefore, increases the population
at risk for married fertility—we observe a comparably larger relative increase in out-of-
wedlock births. This is also reflected in the final column, where we see that an increase
in public social spending by one percentage point of GDP increases the share of children
born out of wedlock by approximately 0.8 percent. This finding is consistent with the view
that the welfare state creates incentives by providing higher support for single mothers
(direct effect, as for instance in the case of AFDC), and with the idea that the welfare
state acts as a substitute for a stable union (indirect effect).
4.2 Alternative Measurements of the Welfare State
While we rely on public social spending to measure the size of the welfare state in our
main analysis, we find very comparable results for public social spending on the family
(see Table 2) and public spending (see Table 3); both spending variables are measured as a
percentage of GDP. Using public social spending on the family has the advantage that it is
the most narrowly defined spending category and contains spending that is closely related
to families. Given this close link to family formation and dissolution, we expect larger
effects with this spending category. Nevertheless, relating public spending categories to
21A more direct test of the effect of the welfare state on the stock of married population, would be to
use the stock of married population as an outcome variable. However, due to limited data availability,
such an analysis is not feasible for a large panel of countries. The stock of population by family status is
usually only available for the census years.
22The estimation results based on the total fertility rate give the same qualitative results; suggest,
however, larger effects (compare the beta coefficients listed in Table B.1 in the Web Appendix).
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family formation and family structure remains a complicated task. For instance, public
expenditure on education is included in public spending, but not in public social spending
(on the family). Since education spending is presumably an important determinant of
family structure, we also look at public spending as a broader measure of the welfare
state.
We see from Tables 2 and 3 that the same qualitative conclusions emerge regardless of
the proxy for the size of the welfare state. Using public social spending on the family, the
magnitudes of the effect of the welfare state generally increase as beta coefficients roughly
double. Note, that in the case of the martial fertility rate the standard errors increase and
the effect is no longer significant at conventional levels.23 For public social spending (the
broadest category), based on strong first-stage regression, all effects remain statistically
significant and magnitudes tend to be somewhat smaller.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
To check the robustness of our results, we ran a number of alternative specifications.
The results are summarized in Figure 6, where the panels are organized by the different
outcome variables.24 Each panel also shows the respective estimates from the baseline
specifications. First, we use lagged public social spending. We obtain very similar effects
on the marriage, divorce, and fertility rate.
Second, we augment the specification with real GDP growth rate as the overall-level
economic activity may also have a potential impact on demographic outcomes (Hellerstein
and Morrill, 2011). We obtain highly similar results. Third, we consider the government’s
ideological orientation. One might be concerned that there is a systematic relationship
between the degree of fractionalization and the government’s ideological orientation. For
instance, if highly fractionalized parliaments tend to have more left- or right-wing gov-
ernments, then our instrument variable may be correlated with unobserved governmental
characteristics that affect demographic outcomes. To measure the government’s ideologi-
cal orientation, we use the ideological composition of the cabinet. In particular, we have
the percentage share of cabinet posts held by left-wing, center, and right-wing parties
(each weighted by days) available. The correlations between these percentage shares and
the Rae-Index are in fact partly statistically significant different from zero. Therefore, we
include the percentage share of cabinet posts held by left-wing and center parties in our
2SLS estimation. The percentage share of cabinet posts held by right-wing parties (and
independents) serves as base group. Again, we obtain highly similar results. Fourth, we
include a three-valued indicator of polarization in the government.25 Again, the results
23Relatedly, the Kleinbergen-Paap F-statistics are generally not overwhelming.
24For our two alternative measurements we performed the same set of alternative specifications. The
Figures B.1 and B.2 in the Web Appendix show that also these estimates are very robust.
25A government is least polarized (41.8 percent of our observations) if it consists only of either left-
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do not change. Finally, in untabulated results we controlled for the share of immigrants,
which does not change our results either.26
We examined longer sample periods since the data on public spending and public
social spending are available since 1970.27 With the longer series starting from 1970, we
obtain the same qualitative results for both measurements (see Tables B.3 and B.4 in
the Web Appendix). The only exception is marriage, where the effects are less precisely
estimated. Quantitatively, we observe a small increase (across all outcomes) in the case of
public social spending, while we see some comparably smaller effects for public spending.
5 Concluding Remarks
Based on country-level data from OECD member countries from the past three decades,
we conclude that a larger welfare state increases the turn-over in the marriage market.
Since the effect on the incidence of marriage dominates the effect on divorce, the stock
of married population increases. In addition, a larger welfare state also raises overall
fertility. Thus, the welfare state supports the formation of families. Yet, we find that
the welfare state crowds-out the traditional organization of the family. The comparable
stronger impact on non-marital fertility (compared to marital fertility) increases the share
of children born out of wedlock.
This can be explained by the economic theory of the family, which also partly corrobo-
rates earlier results. It is consistent with the interpretation that the average welfare state
in OECD member countries entails a positive direct effect that outweighs any negative in-
direct effect. The positive effect on divorce may result from a reduction in the (economic)
cost of divorce by improvements in the post-divorce income situation (for average and
marginal marriages). Put differently, the welfare state facilitates the formation and the
dissolution of families. Whether these family transitions (triggered by the welfare state)
are welfare enhancing or not, cannot be answered and remains an open question. How-
ever, since the welfare state reduces the cost of divorce, it seems plausible that surviving
marriages are of better quality and exhibit higher marital satisfaction. Consequently, we
would expect a lower level of extreme forms of marital distress in countries with a larger
welfare state.28
To which degree can our findings be generalized? As in the case of every instrumental
wing, center, or right-wing parties. It is most polarized if it consists of both left and right-wing parties
(33.3 percent). Medium polarized governments are a mix of left-wing and center parties or right-wing
and center parties (24.9 percent).
26The best available data on the number of foreign-born population we are aware of is included in the
World Development Indicators Database provided by the World Bank. Since information is only available
for every fifth year, we linearly interpolated the series to impute for missing years.
27A caveat is that the public social spending series show a break in 1980.
28Along similar lines, Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) argue that the introduction of unilateral divorce
law, which can also be interpreted as a reduction in the cost of divorce, substantially reduced female
suicide, domestic violence (for both men and women), and females murdered by their partners.
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variable estimation our estimates provide a local average treatment effect. In particular,
they capture the effect of a change in the extent of the welfare state due to a varying
degree of political fractionalization. While it is generally hard to assess the external
validity, it seems attractive that our exogenous variation results from a political process.
A final caveat is that our results measure the impact of marginal changes in the extent
of the welfare state (at the intensive margin) in developed countries, and it is unclear
whether the introduction of a welfare state (a variation at the extensive margin) has the
same effect on the formation and dissolution of families.
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6 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Development of Public Spending Categoriesa
a This graph shows the development of pubic spending, public social spending, and public social spending on the
family averaged across OECD member states from 1970 through 2007. Data on public social spending on the family
is only available since 1980. All public spending categories are measured as percentage of GDP. Further details are
provided in the Data Appendix.
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Figure 2: Public Spending and Legislative Fractionalization in OECD Member
Countries (1980-2007)a
a These graphs show the relationship between public spending (measured as percentage of GDP) and the Rae-Index
of legislative fractionalization of the party-system. A higher value of the Rae-Index indicates a more fragmented
system. For further details please refer to the Data Appendix. The upper panel shows the simple cross-sectional
relationship. The lower panel accounts (via demeaning) for country fixed effects
22
T
a
b
le
1
:
T
h
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
P
u
b
li
c
S
o
ci
a
l
S
p
e
n
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
F
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
D
is
so
lu
ti
o
n
o
f
F
a
m
il
ie
sa
M
a
ri
ta
l
N
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
O
u
t-
o
f-
w
e
d
lo
ck
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
b
D
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
c
F
e
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
d
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
e
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
f
ra
ti
o
g
P
u
b
li
c
so
ci
al
sp
en
d
in
gh
C
o
effi
ci
en
ti
0.
22
4*
*
0.
11
6*
**
1.
19
2*
**
0.
66
7*
0.
65
5*
**
0.
80
2*
*
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rj
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.0
33
)
(0
.4
04
)
(0
.3
87
)
(0
.2
22
)
(0
.3
23
)
E
la
st
ic
it
y
k
[0
.0
26
]
[0
.0
38
]
[0
.0
22
]
[0
.0
16
]
[0
.0
44
]
[0
.0
32
]
B
et
a
co
effi
ci
en
tl
{0
.5
63
}
{0
.3
85
}
{0
.4
78
}
{0
.3
25
}
{0
.3
19
}
{0
.2
54
}
S
ex
-a
ge
-d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
m
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
ou
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
u
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
57
0
57
0
57
0
53
8
53
8
53
8
M
ea
n
of
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
8.
59
3.
05
55
.2
1
42
.5
4
14
.9
4
25
.2
3
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
fi
rs
t
st
ag
es
:
R
ae
-I
n
d
ex
n
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.1
02
**
*
-0
.1
05
**
*
-0
.1
05
**
*
-0
.1
05
**
*
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
20
)
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
o
30
.8
1
30
.8
1
30
.8
1
27
.1
9
27
.1
9
27
.1
9
a
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
a
2
S
L
S
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
m
a
rr
ia
g
e,
d
iv
o
rc
e
a
n
d
fe
rt
il
it
y
b
eh
a
v
io
r.
D
a
ta
fr
o
m
O
E
C
D
-m
em
b
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
fr
o
m
th
e
y
ea
rs
1
9
8
0
th
ro
u
g
h
2
0
0
7
is
u
se
d
.
N
o
te
,
so
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
-y
ea
rs
a
re
m
is
si
n
g
(s
ee
D
a
ta
A
p
p
en
d
ix
).
T
h
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
eq
u
a
l
to
th
e
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(s
ee
b
el
o
w
).
b
T
h
e
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
rr
ia
g
es
p
er
1
,0
0
0
o
f
th
e
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
1
5
a
n
d
6
4
y
ea
rs
(h
en
ce
fo
rt
h
a
d
u
lt
s)
.
c
T
h
e
d
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
o
rc
es
p
er
1
,0
0
0
a
d
u
lt
s.
d
T
h
e
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e
(i
.e
.
b
et
w
ee
n
1
5
a
n
d
4
4
y
ea
rs
o
f
a
g
e)
.
e
T
h
e
m
a
ri
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
m
a
rr
ie
d
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e.
f
T
h
e
n
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
u
n
m
a
rr
ie
d
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e.
g
T
h
e
o
u
t-
o
f-
w
ed
lo
ck
ra
ti
o
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
b
ir
th
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
a
ll
b
ir
th
s
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
.
h
P
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
i
L
is
te
d
co
effi
ci
en
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
a
s
th
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
5
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
a
n
d
1
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
j
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(a
ll
o
w
in
g
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
o
f
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
fo
rm
)
in
ro
u
n
d
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
k
T
h
is
el
a
st
ic
it
y
(c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
m
ea
n
a
s
th
e
b
a
se
)
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
g
iv
es
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
l
T
h
is
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
(b
et
a
)
co
effi
ci
en
t
g
iv
es
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
o
n
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
cr
ea
se
s
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
.
m
T
h
is
in
cl
u
d
es
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
ca
p
tu
ri
n
g
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
se
x
s
in
a
g
e
g
ro
u
p
a
w
h
er
e
a
is
0
−
1
4
,
1
5
−
1
9
,
..
.,
6
0
−
6
4
a
n
d
6
5
+
(1
2
g
ro
u
p
s)
.
n
T
h
e
R
a
e-
In
d
ex
(R
a
e,
1
9
6
8
)
is
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
le
g
is
la
ti
v
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
p
a
rt
y
-s
y
st
em
;
a
h
ig
h
er
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
R
a
e-
In
d
ex
in
d
ic
a
te
s
a
m
o
re
fr
a
g
m
en
te
d
sy
st
em
.
o
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
a
p
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
(K
le
ib
er
g
en
a
n
d
P
a
a
p
,
2
0
0
6
);
n
u
ll
-h
y
p
o
th
es
is
is
th
a
t
in
st
ru
m
en
t
is
w
ea
k
.
23
T
a
b
le
2
:
T
h
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
P
u
b
li
c
S
o
ci
a
l
S
p
e
n
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
F
a
m
il
y
o
n
th
e
F
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
D
is
so
lu
ti
o
n
o
f
F
a
m
il
ie
sa
M
a
ri
ta
l
N
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
O
u
t-
o
f-
w
e
d
lo
ck
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
b
D
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
c
F
e
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
d
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
e
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
f
ra
ti
o
g
P
u
b
li
c
so
ci
al
sp
en
d
.
on
th
e
fa
m
il
y
h
C
o
effi
ci
en
ti
2.
55
8*
*
1.
36
7*
*
13
.6
23
**
7.
46
0
8.
08
5*
*
10
.2
05
**
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rj
(1
.2
85
)
(0
.5
92
)
(5
.8
97
)
(5
.1
44
)
(3
.2
07
)
(4
.7
52
)
E
la
st
ic
it
y
k
[0
.2
98
]
[0
.4
48
]
[0
.2
47
]
[0
.1
75
]
[0
.5
41
]
[0
.4
04
]
B
et
a
co
effi
ci
en
tl
{1
.2
92
}
{0
.9
10
}
{1
.0
92
}
{0
.7
30
}
{0
.7
90
}
{0
.6
50
}
S
ex
-a
ge
-d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
m
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
ou
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
u
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
56
8
56
8
56
8
53
6
53
6
53
6
M
ea
n
of
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
8.
59
3.
05
55
.1
9
42
.5
2
14
.9
6
25
.2
6
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
fi
rs
t
st
ag
es
:
R
ae
-I
n
d
ex
n
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
09
**
*
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
o
6.
74
6.
74
6.
74
6.
23
6.
23
6.
23
a
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
a
2
S
L
S
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
fa
m
il
y
o
n
m
a
rr
ia
g
e,
d
iv
o
rc
e
a
n
d
fe
rt
il
it
y
b
eh
a
v
io
r.
D
a
ta
fr
o
m
O
E
C
D
-m
em
b
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
fr
o
m
th
e
y
ea
rs
1
9
8
0
th
ro
u
g
h
2
0
0
7
is
u
se
d
.
N
o
te
,
so
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
-y
ea
rs
a
re
m
is
si
n
g
(s
ee
D
a
ta
A
p
p
en
d
ix
).
T
h
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
eq
u
a
l
to
th
e
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(s
ee
b
el
o
w
).
b
T
h
e
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
rr
ia
g
es
p
er
1
,0
0
0
o
f
th
e
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
1
5
a
n
d
6
4
y
ea
rs
(h
en
ce
fo
rt
h
a
d
u
lt
s)
.
c
T
h
e
d
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
o
rc
es
p
er
1
,0
0
0
a
d
u
lt
s.
d
T
h
e
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e
(i
.e
.
b
et
w
ee
n
1
5
a
n
d
4
4
y
ea
rs
o
f
a
g
e)
.
e
T
h
e
m
a
ri
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
m
a
rr
ie
d
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e.
f
T
h
e
n
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
u
n
m
a
rr
ie
d
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e.
g
T
h
e
o
u
t-
o
f-
w
ed
lo
ck
ra
ti
o
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
b
ir
th
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
a
ll
b
ir
th
s
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
.
h
P
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
fa
m
il
y
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
i
L
is
te
d
co
effi
ci
en
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
a
s
th
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
fa
m
il
y
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
5
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
a
n
d
1
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
j
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(a
ll
o
w
in
g
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
o
f
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
fo
rm
)
in
ro
u
n
d
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
k
T
h
is
el
a
st
ic
it
y
(c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
m
ea
n
a
s
th
e
b
a
se
)
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
g
iv
es
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
fa
m
il
y
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
l
T
h
is
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
(b
et
a
)
co
effi
ci
en
t
g
iv
es
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
o
n
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
cr
ea
se
s
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
fa
m
il
y.
m
T
h
is
in
cl
u
d
es
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
ca
p
tu
ri
n
g
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
se
x
s
in
a
g
e
g
ro
u
p
a
w
h
er
e
a
is
0
−
1
4
,
1
5
−
1
9
,
..
.,
6
0
−
6
4
a
n
d
6
5
+
(1
2
g
ro
u
p
s)
.
n
T
h
e
R
a
e-
In
d
ex
(R
a
e,
1
9
6
8
)
is
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
le
g
is
la
ti
v
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
p
a
rt
y
-s
y
st
em
;
a
h
ig
h
er
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
R
a
e-
In
d
ex
in
d
ic
a
te
s
a
m
o
re
fr
a
g
m
en
te
d
sy
st
em
.
o
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
a
p
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
(K
le
ib
er
g
en
a
n
d
P
a
a
p
,
2
0
0
6
);
n
u
ll
-h
y
p
o
th
es
is
is
th
a
t
in
st
ru
m
en
t
is
w
ea
k
.
24
T
a
b
le
3
:
T
h
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
P
u
b
li
c
S
p
e
n
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
F
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
D
is
so
lu
ti
o
n
o
f
F
a
m
il
ie
sa
M
a
ri
ta
l
N
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
O
u
t-
o
f-
w
e
d
lo
ck
M
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
b
D
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
c
F
e
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
d
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
e
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
f
ra
ti
o
g
P
u
b
li
c
sp
en
d
in
gh
C
o
effi
ci
en
ti
0.
10
4*
**
0.
03
2*
*
0.
60
7*
**
0.
38
5*
*
0.
24
5*
*
0.
31
9*
*
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rj
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
85
)
(0
.1
08
)
(0
.1
56
)
E
la
st
ic
it
y
k
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
11
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
15
]
[0
.0
12
]
B
et
a
co
effi
ci
en
tl
{0
.4
05
}
{0
.1
63
}
{0
.3
65
}
{0
.2
90
}
{0
.1
79
}
{0
.1
56
}
S
ex
-a
ge
-d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
m
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
ou
n
tr
y
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
u
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
58
0
58
0
58
0
54
7
54
7
54
7
M
ea
n
of
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
8.
45
3.
06
55
.6
7
42
.0
5
15
.8
8
26
.5
5
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
fi
rs
t
st
ag
es
:
R
ae
-I
n
d
ex
n
-0
.2
02
**
*
-0
.2
02
**
*
-0
.2
02
**
*
-0
.2
01
**
*
-0
.2
01
**
*
-0
.2
01
**
*
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
34
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
36
)
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
o
35
.8
2
35
.8
2
35
.8
2
31
.4
2
31
.4
2
31
.4
2
a
T
h
is
ta
b
le
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
s
re
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
a
2
S
L
S
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
sp
en
d
in
g
o
n
m
a
rr
ia
g
e,
d
iv
o
rc
e
a
n
d
fe
rt
il
it
y
b
eh
a
v
io
r.
D
a
ta
fr
o
m
O
E
C
D
-m
em
b
er
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
fr
o
m
th
e
y
ea
rs
1
9
8
0
th
ro
u
g
h
2
0
0
8
is
u
se
d
.
N
o
te
,
so
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
-y
ea
rs
a
re
m
is
si
n
g
(s
ee
D
a
ta
A
p
p
en
d
ix
).
T
h
e
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
eq
u
a
l
to
th
e
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
(s
ee
b
el
o
w
).
b
T
h
e
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
rr
ia
g
es
p
er
1
,0
0
0
o
f
th
e
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
1
5
a
n
d
6
4
y
ea
rs
(h
en
ce
fo
rt
h
a
d
u
lt
s)
.
c
T
h
e
d
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
d
iv
o
rc
es
p
er
1
,0
0
0
a
d
u
lt
s.
d
T
h
e
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e
(i
.e
.
b
et
w
ee
n
1
5
a
n
d
4
4
y
ea
rs
o
f
a
g
e)
.
e
T
h
e
m
a
ri
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
m
a
rr
ie
d
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e.
f
T
h
e
n
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
a
b
so
lu
te
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
li
v
e
b
ir
th
s
to
a
ll
u
n
m
a
rr
ie
d
fe
m
a
le
s
p
er
1
,0
0
0
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
ch
il
d
b
ea
ri
n
g
a
g
e.
g
T
h
e
o
u
t-
o
f-
w
ed
lo
ck
ra
ti
o
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
n
o
n
-m
a
ri
ta
l
b
ir
th
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
a
ll
b
ir
th
s
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
.
h
P
u
b
li
c
sp
en
d
in
g
is
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
i
L
is
te
d
co
effi
ci
en
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
a
s
th
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
sp
en
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
*
,
*
*
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
st
a
ti
st
ic
a
l
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
5
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
a
n
d
1
-p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
j
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(a
ll
o
w
in
g
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
o
f
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
fo
rm
)
in
ro
u
n
d
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
k
T
h
is
el
a
st
ic
it
y
(c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
m
ea
n
a
s
th
e
b
a
se
)
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
g
iv
es
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
sp
en
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
l
T
h
is
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
(b
et
a
)
co
effi
ci
en
t
g
iv
es
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
o
n
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
in
cr
ea
se
s
in
p
u
b
li
c
sp
en
d
in
g
.
m
T
h
is
in
cl
u
d
es
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
ca
p
tu
ri
n
g
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
th
e
to
ta
l
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
o
f
se
x
s
in
a
g
e
g
ro
u
p
a
w
h
er
e
a
is
0
−
1
4
,
1
5
−
1
9
,
..
.,
6
0
−
6
4
a
n
d
6
5
+
(1
2
g
ro
u
p
s)
.
n
T
h
e
R
a
e-
In
d
ex
(R
a
e,
1
9
6
8
)
is
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
th
e
d
eg
re
e
o
f
le
g
is
la
ti
v
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
p
a
rt
y
-s
y
st
em
;
a
h
ig
h
er
v
a
lu
e
o
f
th
e
R
a
e-
In
d
ex
in
d
ic
a
te
s
a
m
o
re
fr
a
g
m
en
te
d
sy
st
em
.
p
K
le
ib
er
g
en
-P
a
a
p
F
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
(K
le
ib
er
g
en
a
n
d
P
a
a
p
,
2
0
0
6
);
n
u
ll
-h
y
p
o
th
es
is
is
th
a
t
in
st
ru
m
en
t
is
w
ea
k
.
25
F
ig
u
re
3
:
S
e
n
si
ti
v
it
y
A
n
a
ly
si
s
o
f
th
e
E
ff
e
ct
o
f
P
u
b
li
c
S
o
ci
a
l
S
p
e
n
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
F
o
rm
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
D
is
so
lu
ti
o
n
o
f
F
a
m
il
ie
s
a
T
h
es
e
g
ra
p
h
s
su
m
m
a
ri
ze
se
v
er
a
l
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s
ch
ec
k
s
o
f
th
e
2
S
L
S
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
s
re
su
lt
s
o
f
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
th
e
w
el
fa
re
st
a
te
o
n
d
iff
er
en
t
fa
m
il
y
o
u
tc
o
m
es
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
T
a
b
le
1
.
T
h
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
co
effi
ci
en
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
w
it
h
th
e
b
a
rs
.
In
p
a
rt
ic
u
la
r,
th
ey
re
p
re
se
n
t
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
v
e
el
a
st
ic
it
ie
s
(c
a
lc
u
la
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
m
ea
n
a
s
th
e
b
a
se
),
w
h
ic
h
g
iv
e
(m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
1
0
0
)
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
c
ra
te
(r
a
ti
o
)
d
u
e
to
a
n
o
n
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
p
o
in
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
m
ea
su
re
d
a
s
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
o
f
G
D
P
.
T
h
e
w
h
is
k
er
s
in
ea
ch
b
a
r
sh
o
w
9
5
p
er
ce
n
t
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
in
te
rv
a
ls
b
a
se
d
o
n
ro
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(a
ll
o
w
in
g
fo
r
h
et
er
o
sk
ed
a
st
ic
it
y
o
f
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
fo
rm
).
E
a
ch
p
a
n
el
sh
o
w
s
fi
rs
t
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
T
a
b
le
1
.
T
h
e
se
co
n
d
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
u
se
s
la
g
g
ed
p
u
b
li
c
so
ci
a
l
sp
en
d
in
g
in
st
ea
d
o
f
th
e
co
n
te
m
p
o
ra
n
eo
u
s
v
a
lu
e.
T
h
e
th
ir
d
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ex
te
n
d
s
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
b
y
a
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t’
s
id
eo
lo
g
ic
a
l
o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
(i
.e
.
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
sh
a
re
o
f
ca
b
in
et
s
p
o
st
s
h
el
d
b
y
le
ft
-w
in
g
,
ce
n
te
r,
a
n
d
ri
g
h
t-
w
in
g
p
a
rt
ie
s;
ea
ch
w
ei
g
h
te
d
b
y
d
a
y
s)
.
T
h
e
fo
u
rt
h
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ex
te
n
d
s
ex
te
n
d
s
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
b
y
a
th
re
e-
v
a
lu
ed
in
d
ic
a
to
r
o
f
p
o
la
ri
za
ti
o
n
in
th
e
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t.
26
A. Data Appendix
Our analysis includes all OECD-member states (which joined the organization before
1974) with the exception of Turkey. That means, our estimation sample comprises Aus-
tralia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI),
France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Japan
(JP), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Portu-
gal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), and the
United States (US). We excluded Turkey from our analysis, since data on marriage, di-
vorce and fertility behavior is not available for most of the years. For the other countries
we have been successful to compile a data set based on official sources that covers almost
all country-years for the period from 1970 through 2007. Public social expenditures on
the family is not available before 1980.
Data on the absolute number of marriages, divorces, births (total, marital and non-
marital) and population (by sex and age-groups) are obtained from different sources.
For all EU Member States (as well as NO and CH) we use data provided by Eurostat.
For the US the numbers of marriages, divorces and births are from annual editions of the
Vital Statistics. US (sex-specific) adult population data is calculated from county-level
data from the Reading Survey of Epidemiology and End Results provided by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Information for all other remaining non-EU Member States
(AU, CA, and JP) is from the United Nation Database, supplemented with data from
various national yearbooks and additional data provided by respective national statistical
offices (upon request). This support is thankfully acknowledged. Further details are
available upon request. Based on this data we defined the marriage rate as the absolute
number of marriages per 1, 000 of the population between 15 and 64 years of age. This
variable is missing for the following country-years: AU(1980-81, 1991-92, 2002-03, 2005-
07), CA(1980, 1991-1992, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2007), JP(1980, 1991, 2007), NZ(1971-72,
1980-81, 1991, 2004, 2006-2007), and UK(1971, 2006). We exclude two country-years
with exceptionally high number of marriages due to a policy intervention: AT(1987) and
SE(1989). The divorce rate is defined as the absolute number of divorces per 1, 000
of the population between 15 and 64 years of age; and missing for AU(1980-81, 1991-
92, 2002-03, 2005-07), CA(1980, 1991-1992, 1999, 2000, 2004-07), FR(2007), JP(1980,
1991, 2007), NZ(1971-72, 1980-81, 1991, 2004, 2006-2007), ES(2006), and UK(1971). The
fertility rate is defined as the absolute number of live births to all females per 1, 000
female population of childbearing age (i. e. between 15 and 44 years of age); and missing
for AU(1991-92, 2002-03, 2005-07), CA(1974-2000, 2005-07), JP(2007), NZ(1972, 2004,
2007), and US(2003− 07). The marital fertility rate is defined as the absolute number
of live births to all married females per 1, 000 female population of childbearing age;
and missing for AU(1991-92, 2002-03, 2005-07), BE(2001-02,) CA(1974-2007), IT(2004),
JP(1971-2007), NZ(1972, 2004, 2007), UK(1981) and US(2003-07). The non-marital
fertility rate is defined as the absolute number of live births to all unmarried females per
1, 000 female population of childbearing age; and missing for the same country-years as the
marital fertility rate. The out-of-wedlock ratio is defined as the number of non-marital
births divided by all births multiplied by 100; and missing for the same country-years as
the marital fertility rate.
Data on public social spending (starting with 1980) and public social spending
on the family is derived from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. This database
classifies expenditure items as social if the benefits are intended to address one or more
A.1
social purposes, and if programs regulating the provision involve either inter-personal re-
distribution, or compulsory participation. Public social spending may arise from cash
benefits, social services or tax breaks with a social purpose. Consult OECD (2011) for
more details on the composition of public social expenditures as measured by the OECD.
Information on both variables is available for all country-years from 1980 through 2007
with exception of AT(1981-84, 1986-89), IS(1981-89), and NO(1982-84, 1986-87). In-
formation on public social spending is further missing for NO(1981). The OECD also
provides information on public social spending before 1980; however, there is (as Figure 1
shows) an obvious break in the series.
Data on public spending is from different OECD sources. This variable measures
total government spending as percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP). Note,
the OECD refers to this variable as ‘general government total outlays’. It consists of
current outlays plus capital outlays. Current outlays are the sum of current consumption,
transfer payments, subsidies and property income paid (including interest payments).
Data refer to the general government sector, which is a consolidation of accounts for the
central, state and local government plus social security. For further details on sources and
methods refer to an issue of the OECD Economic Outlook. This variable is available for
all country-years, with exception of IS(1970-79), LU(1970-89), NZ(1982-85), PT(1970-76)
and CH(1976-89).
Data on the Rae-Index is obtained from the Comparative Political Data Set I (23
OECD Countries) provided by Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler, Panajotis Potolidis,
Marle´ne Gerber and Philipp Leimgruber; see http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/
klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html. The Rae-Index
is defined as 1−∑ni=1 s2i , where si is the share of seats for party i and n the number of par-
ties. That means, it is a index of legislative fractionalization of the party-system according
to the formula proposed by (Rae, 1968). This variable is available for all country-years.
A.2
B. Web Appendix
Table B.1: The Effect of the Welfare State on the Total Fertility Ratea
Public social PSS Public
spending on the family spending
Welfare stateb
Coefficientc 0.046*** 0.662** 0.023***
Standard errord (0.013) (0.304) (0.006)
Elasticitye [0.027] [0.393] [0.013]
Beta coefficientf {0.876} {2.535} {0.655}
Sex-age-distributiong Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 549 548 552
Mean of dependent variable 1.68 1.68 1.70
Summary of first stages :
Rae-Indexh -0.103*** -0.007** -0.206***
(0.019) (0.003) (0.035)
F-statistici 28.79 4.94 34.12
a This table summarizes results from a 2SLS estimation of the effect of the welfare state on fertility behavior which
is captured by the total fertility rate. Data from OECD-member countries from the years 1980 through 2007 is
used. Note, some country-years are missing. The instrumental variable is equal to the a measure of fractionalization
(see below). The total fertility rate is defined as the total number of children that would be born to each woman
if she were to live to the end of her child-bearing years and give birth to children in agreement with the prevailing
age-specific fertility rates by the OECD. b In the first column the size of the welfare state is measured with public
social spending, in the second column with public social spending on the family, and in the third column with total
public spending. Each variables is scaled as percentage of GDP. c Listed coefficients are reported as the change in
the specific rate (ratio) due to an one percentage point increase in the respective measure of the welfare state. *,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
d Robust standard errors (allowing for heteroskedasticity of unknown form) in round parentheses. e This elasticity
(calculated using the unweighted mean as the base) multiplied by 100 gives the percentage change in the specific rate
(ratio) due to an one percentage point increase in the respective measure of the welfare state. f This standardized
(beta) coefficient gives the standard deviation increase in the specific rate (ratio) due to a one standard deviation
increases in the respective measure of the welfare state. g This includes variables capturing the share of the total
population of sex s in age group a where a is 0−14, 15−19, . . . , 60−64 and 65+ (12 groups). h The Rae-Index (Rae,
1968) is a measure of the degree of legislative fractionalization of the party-system; a higher value of the Rae-Index
indicates a more fragmented system. i Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006); null-hypothesis is
that instrument is weak.
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